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ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether Judge Sorensen committed reversible error in
granting hospital's motion for summary judgment because the
plaintiffs were aware of Mrs, Brower's leg injury and knew or
should have known that it was possibly caused by hospital's
negligence, more than two years before commencing this action.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following determinative statutes, rules and
regulations are set forth in relevant part in the addendum:

Utah

Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. §§78-14-4 and 8 (1953 as
amended) and Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a medical malpractice

action in which plaintiffs-appellants Saundra Brower and Frank
Oscar Brower ("Browers") seek damages for injuries allegedly
caused by a puncture wound to Saundra Brower's right leg, which
allegedly occurred while she was in the recovery room, following
her hysterectomy in the Valley View Medical Center ("hospital")
on October 22, 1980.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

Proceedings and Disposition Below,

Browers1 action

against the hospital is confined to allegations of damages
related to the puncture wound in her right leg.

On February 21,

1985, Judge Allen B. Sorensen of the Fifth Judicial District
Court, Iron County, granted hospital's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed Browers1 action with prejudice, on the
grounds that this action was barred by the statute of limitations
because Browers discovered this injury and the possibility of
hospital's negligence on October 22, 1980, more than two years
before filing this action.

Browers' motion for partial summary

judgment that her action was not barred by the statute of
limitations was denied. (R. at 138).
C.

Statement of Facts.

On October 22, 1980, Saundra

Brower underwent a surgical hysterectomy which was performed by
co-defendant-respondent Dr. David W. Brown in a hospital
operating room.

Following this surgery, and as Mrs. Brower was

being taken from the recovery room, she awoke from the
anesthesia.

At this time, she experienced pain in her right

thigh, just above the knee, which was more severe than any pain
she had ever had.
do to my leg?

She immediately began screaming "What did you

What happened to my leg?" (Saundra Brower Dep. p.

47-48).
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Mrs. Browerfs husband and sister, who were present at
the time, observed a lot of blood coming from a puncture wound
five or six inches above her right knee.

Mrs. Brower recalls her

sister commenting that the leg was bleeding and asking what had
happened. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 47 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 1820).
Mrs. Brower was placed in a hospital bed, the puncture
wound was bandaged and heat was applied. (Saundra Brower Dep. p.
117).
After she fully awoke, Mrs. Brower discovered a large
oval shaped bumpy bruise above her right knee, which was
approximately two inches wide and four inches long.

Mrs. Brower

also noticed that there was a puncture mark in the center of the
bruise, "like an injection hole". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 49,
124).
A few hours later, when the anesthesiologist visited
the room, Mrs. Brower asked what he had done to her leg.

The

anesthesiologist examined the leg and told her "I didn't do
that", "That wasn't there when you left the operating room" and
"Whatever happened happened to you in the recovery room."
(Saundra Brower Dep. p. 50). Mrs. Brower later testified that,
at this point, she "knew there was a problem" and that "something

-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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had happened that was improper". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 120121).
Mrs. Brower consulted with her sister and was told that
when she was being brought from the recovery room "blood was
spurting from her leg" and that the nurse told her "I don't
know". (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 117).
Thereafter, Mrs. Brower "asked everybody" who came to
care for her for information about the puncture wound.

She

complained to Nurse Condra Lawrencef who responded by checking
the puncture area.

Nurse Lawrence told them that she did not

know why this had been done. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 52 and
Condra Lawrence Dep. p. 14, 19).
Later this same day, Dr. Brown became available and the
Browers asked him what had happened.

Dr. Brown examined the leg

and told them "he did not know but he would find out". (Saundra
Brower Dep. p. 51 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21).
Following this conversation, neither Mrs. Brower nor
her husband had any further conversations with Dr. Brown
regarding the puncture wound.

Mrs. Brower later testified that

Dr. Brown never again said anything about her leg.

(Saundra

Brower Dep. p. 53 and Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21).
On October 28, while still experiencing constant pain
and a cramping feeling at the site of the puncture wound, Mrs.
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Brower was discharged from the hospital.

(Saundra Brower Dep. p.

54).
On February 16f 1983f almost four months after the twoyear statute of limitations had lapsed, Browers served the
hospital with a notice of intent to commence this action. (R. at
1 para 8 ) .
Browers1 complaint against the hospital was filed on
June 14, 1983, almost eight months after the limitation period
had run.

Allegations against the hospital are limited to

negligence and injuries relating to Mrs. Brower1s puncture
wound.

Browers1 complaint does not allege that the hospital

prevented them from discovering negligence or misconduct or any
other facts which would extend the two-year statute of
limitations. (R. at 1 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Browers1 action is barred by the statute of limitations
because they discovered the injury and the possibility of
hospital's negligence on October 22, 1980, more than two years
before filing this action.
Utah Code Annotated §78-14-4 cuts off all medical
malpractice claims not brought within two years after a plaintiff
discovers or should have discovered an injury.

This Court has

consistently ruled that an injury is deemed to have been
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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discovered and the statute of limitations begins to run when a
plaintiff discovers the fact of the injury and the possibility
that it may have been caused by negligence.

Certainty of

causation and negligence is not required and the injury need not
be catastrophic for the statute to begin to run.

Regardless of

whether a plaintiff has conferred with experts, the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time one knows or should know of
an injury and the possibility of negligence.
Judge Sorensen's judgment below was based upon the
Browers1 own uncontradicted testimony thatf over two years before
commencing this action, they knew that Mrs. Brower's leg had been
injured in the recovery room and believed that something
"improper" had happened.
ARGUMENT

BROWERS1 ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
BECAUSE THEY DISCOVERED THEIR LEGAL INJURY ON OCTOBER
22, 1980f MORE THAN TWO YEARS BEFORE FILING THIS
ACTION.

I.

A.

The Statute of Limitations Began to Run On October 22,
1980, When Browers Became Aware of Their Injury and the
Possibility of Hospital's Negligence.
Browers1 claim was not commenced within two years

following their discovery that they had a possible cause of
action against the hospital.

Consequently, their claim is

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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forever barred.

Utah Code Annotated §§78-14-4 cuts off all

medical malpractice claims not brought within two years after a
plaintiff discovers or should have discovered a possible cause of
action.

This statutory limitation period states in pertinent

part that:
No malpractice action against a health
care provider may be brought unless it
is commenced within two years after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or
through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs,. . .
U.C.A. §78-14-4 (Supp. 1981.)
Thus, a plaintiff's cause of action accrues, and the statute of
limitations begins to run, when the plaintiff "discovers the
injury" and the action is barred two years from that date.

The

leading pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court on what constitutes discovery of the injury is Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144
(Utah 1979).
In Foil the court ruled that "the statute begins to run
when an injured person knows or should know that he has suffered
a legal injury" Id. at 147.

Discovery of a "legal injury" means

that the plaintiff must have discovered both the fact of the
injury and the possibility that the injury may have been caused
by the negligence of the health care provider. Reiser v. Lohner,
641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Precise certainty of causation and negligence is not
required for a cause of action to accrue.

Rather, the discovery

of causation and negligence may be either actual or presumptive.

It is sufficient if the plaintiff is on inquiry notice of

a possible cause of action or should know of the defendant's
possible negligence.

See Massey v. Litton, 669 P.2d 248, 251

(Nev. 1983) (adopting the Foil rule that the limitation period
begins to run when the plaintiff is on "inquiry notice" of a
possible cause of action) and Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708,
712 (N.D. 1983) (holding that a medical malpractice statute
begins to run when the plaintiff knows or should know of a
defendant's "possible negligence").
In Foil, the court found that, because the plaintiff
had a history of back injuries, prior to the defendant's
negligent treatment, the plaintiff did not know and could not
have known that defendant's negligent treatment caused additional
injury.

Unlike the plaintiff in Foil, Browers were aware of both

the injury and the possibility that it had been caused by
hospital's negligence.
The Browers' own testimony establishes that on October
22, 1980, the date of surgery, they were aware that Mrs. Brower's
right thigh had been injured because something "improper" had
happened.
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

On October 22, 1980, More Than Two Years Before Filing
This Action, Browers Knew of Their Injury and Knew or
Should Have Known that it was Possibly Caused by
Hospital's Negligence.
Saundra Brower and her husband both testified that on

October 22, 1980, they discovered that Mrs. Brower's thigh had
been injured.

During her deposition, Mrs. Brower said that, as

she was being taken from the recovery room, she awoke from the
anesthesia and experienced pain in her right thigh which was more
severe than any pain which she could remember.

Mrs. Brower's

husband and sister were both present at the time and observed
that there was a lot of blood coming from a puncture wound five
or six inches above the right knee.

Mrs. Brower further

testified that when she fully awoke she discovered a large oval
shaped bumpy bruise approximately two inches wide and four inches
long.

She also noted that there was a puncture mark in the

center of the bruise "like an injection hole". (Saundra Brower
Dep. p. 47-49, 117, 124).
Mrs. Brower admitted that because her operation had
nothing to do with her leg, she and her husband were
suspicious.

As a result, Mrs. Brower confronted the
<

anesthesiologist and asked what he had done to her leg.

He

denied having done anything and indicated that the injury wasn't
there when she had left the operating room and that whatever
1

-9-
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happened must have taken place in the recovery room.

Mrs. Brower

testified, that, at this point, she and her husband knew that
there was a problem and that something had happened that was
improper. (Saundra Brower Dep. p. 50, 120-121).
Mrs. Brower testified that, thereafter, she asked
everyone who came to care for her for information concerning the
puncture wound.

Nurse Condra Lawrence examined the wound and

told the Browers she did not know why this had been done.

Dr.

Brown told the Browers that he did not know what had happened but
would find out.
injury.

He never said anything further about the

The Browers both testified that, thereafter, they tried

many times to find out what happened. (Oscar Brower Dep. p. 21
and Saundra Brower Dep. p. 51-53).
By their own testimony, Browers knew or at least should
have known, on October 22, 1980, that Saundra Browerfs puncture
wound was possibly caused by hospital's negligence.

The Browers

and their counsel have conceded the obviousness of this
conclusion by alleging that res ipsa loquitur is applicable and
that the puncture wound "would not have occurred without the
negligence of someone." (R. at 1. para. 26).
Although Judge Sorensen's order of dismissal is based
upon the Browers1 own uncontradicted testimony, Browers1 brief
suggests several reasons why the order was not appropriate.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Browers1 brief claims, for the first time, that the hospital
suppressed evidence of misconduct, thereby tolling the running of
the limitation period.

Their complaint contains no such

allegation and the record below fails to support this eleventh
hour speculation.

The mere fact that the complaint omits such an

allegation is sufficient to bar Browers from relying on the
"fraudulent concealment" extension to the statute of
limitations.

See U.C.A. §78-14-4(b) (1953 as amended).

Browers next claim that Dr. Brown's failure to discuss
the leg injury or to give some explanation for its cause, misled
them into thinking that it was an unavoidable consequence of the
hysterectomy.
testimony.

This argument is contrary to the Browers' own

Mrs. Brower testified thatf because the leg injury

did not appear to be related to the hysterectomy, she thought
that perhaps some additional surgery had been performed, and
"knew there was a problem" and believed that "something had
happened that was improper."

(Saundra Brower Dep. p. 120-121).

Browers next argue they had no reason to know that Mrs.
Brower's thigh injury may have resulted from someone's negligence
until she consulted Dr. Bever and Dr. Pandya on July, 1981.

Mrs.

Browerfs account of her conversations with these doctors,
however, contains only a passing reference to the thigh injury.
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gynecological/surgical procedures and follow up care. The record
below contains no indication that any new facts about the thigh
injury came to light as a result of Mrs. Brower's consultations
with these doctors. Browers had as much knowledge about this
injury on October 22, 1980, the day of Saundra Brower's surgery,
as they did in July, 1981.
In a related argument, Browers contend that the statute
of limitations should not begin to run until a plaintiff has been
told by a medical expert that he or she has a cause of action.
Browers suggest that the statute should not run against a lay
person, who has not consulted an.expert, unless the injury is
catastrophic.

Browers fail to explain what is meant by

"catastrophic" or why this Court should adopt such a rule.
Browers1 brief, however, implies that unless the negligence
associated with an injury is obvious, the statute of limitations
should not run until a plaintiff has conferred with medical
experts.

As discussed above, the standard established by the

legislature and by this Court in Foil is contrary.

The statute

of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should
know of an injury and the possibility of a negligent cause.
The central reasoning behind the Foil decision was to
encourage a potential claimant to diligently move forward and

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the injury and the possibility of negligence.

Such diligence is

not encouraged if the claimant can casually wait for expert
confirmation of his claims or negligence before the statute
begins to run.

As noted in Dawson v. Eli Lilly and Co., 543 F.

Supp. 1330, 1334f (D.D.C. 1982) (emphasis in the original):
If the statute of limitations did not
begin to run merely because a plaintiff
who knew of a possible cause relationship
and did not rely on any representations
to the contrary did not have certain
knowledge of causation, no claim or
causation which could be disputed
would ever accrue.
See also Duncan v. Augter, 661 P.2d 83, 86 (Or. App. 1983)
(holding that the statute of limitations begins to run in medical
malpractice actions when the plaintiff knows "facts from which a
reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff's injury
was caused by an act of the defendant that was somehow
negligent." emphasis added)
In Hove v. McMaster, 621 P.2d 694 (Utah 1980), the Utah
Supreme Court applied the Foil rule in a manner consistent with
Dawson and Duncan.

The claimant in Hove received anesthetic

injections while having her teeth filled.

During the injection

she felt "an unusual" or "different" shock in her face and in the
ensuing months she had a tingling sensation in the area of the
injection.

One year later she consulted a neurologist who told
i
*
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her that the injection was a possible cause of her pain.

Three

years after the treatment she was examined by another neurologist
who told her that her pain was definitely caused by the
injection*

The action was filed a few months later.
This Court affirmed dismissal of the action based on a

finding that discovery occurred more than two years before the
action was filed.

This Court explained that before the plaintiff

consulted the first neurologist, she was "expected to have
recognized the possibility that the recurring discomforts were
the result of the injection..."

Id. at 696 (emphasis added).

Hove confirms that the rule in Foil only requires the claimant to
have general knowledge of the negligence and possible causation
aspects of the injury for the medical malpractice statute of
limitations to begin running and that there is no requirement
that the injury be catastrophic or that the plaintiff have expert
advice.
Finally, Browers argue the propriety of not allowing a
separate trial on the issue of the statute of limitations under
U.C.A. §78-12-47.

Initially, this is an improper argument in

that it is raised for the first time on appeal and had absolutely
nothing to do with Judge Sorensen's decision.

Secondly, in

Reiser v. Lohner, supra, this Court clearly held that the statute
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of limitations issue is subject to summary judgment when no
genuine issues of material fact are raised.

_Id_. at 100.

By their own uncontradicted admissions, Browers were
aware, on October 22, 1980f that Mrs. Brower had been injured
while in the recovery roomf that this injury was not related to
her hysterectomy, and that "something had happened that was improper".

(Saundra Brower Dep. p. 121). As the District Court

Judge who initially ruled on defendant's motion for summary
judgment in Reiser v. Lohnerf supra, Judge Sorensen is very
familiar with this area of the law and his ruling that this
action was not commenced within two years, as required by Utah
Code Ann. §78-14-4, was based upon substantial evidence and
should be affirmed.

Hove v. McMaster, supra at 696.
CONCLUSION

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act was enacted for
the purpose of limiting malpractice claims of individuals who
through delay, neglect or mere inattention fail to bring their
claims witin two years following the discovery of the existence
of a potential claim.

Browers, in this case, had over two years

in which to commence an action against the hospital but failed to
do so.

Judge Sorensen's order dismissing this action with

prejudice should be upheld.

-15-
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Respectfully submitted this / ^ " ^ d a y of September,
1985, Salt Lake City, Utah.

KIRTON,

Attorneys for DefendantRespondent I ./fl.C^Hospitals Inc.
a corporatioru-affd I.H.C.
Hospitals Inc., a corporation
doing business as Valley View
Medical Center
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Charles W. Dahlquist, II - #A0798
William H. Wingo - #A3522
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL
Attorneys for Defendant
IHC Hospitals, Inc., dba
Valley View Medical Center
330 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-3680
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SAUNDRA BROWER and
FRANK OSCAR BROWER,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER

-vsDR. DAVID W. BROWN and
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC.,
a corporation, and
I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC.,
a corporation doing business as
VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants.

Civil No. 10201

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant I.H.C. HOSPITA4S (
INC., a corporation, and I.H.C. HOSPITALS, INC., a corporation
doing business as VALLEY VIEW MEDICAL CENTER (hereinafter referred
to as "Hospital"), having come on for argument before the Honorabl^
Allen B. Sorensen, the hospital being represented by Charles W.
Dahlquist, II, Defendant Dr. David W. Brown being represented by
Jody K. Burnett, and Plaintiffs being represented by Russell A.

on, McConki*
I Bu»hn«ll
tasaonal Corporation |
0 S 300 EAST
U.T LAKE CITY
UTAH 84111
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Cannon, the Court having heard full argument on the matter and
being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant Hospital's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby
granted; Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having
been fully considered by and argued before the Court is hereby
denied; and Plaintiffs' action against Defendant Hospital is hereby)
dismissed with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs.
DATED this tS^\

day of

^ r < ^

, 198

BY THE COURT:

^^K^AH^O
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, District Judge Ret,
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CANNON & WILKINSON
By: Russell A. Cannon
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 355-8100
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

--v f i
•

-

*

•?*$&*^

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SAUNDRA BROWER and
FRANK OSCAR BROWER,

JUDGMENT DENYING PLAINTIFFS1
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
DR DAVID W, BROWN,
et al.,

CASE NO. 1020X

Defendants.
The motions for partial summary judgment of plaintiffs as
against each of the Defendants respectively, having come on
regularly for hearing December 19, 1984, before the above entitled
court, Russell A. Cannon appearing for Plaintiffs, Charles
Dahlquist appearing for Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc. dba
Valley View Medical Center, and Jody K. Burnett appearing for
Defendant Dr. David W. Brown; and the court having reviewed the
pleadings and memoranda on file herein, and having heard the
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arguments of counsel, and the court being fully advised m the
premises, good cause appearing therefore, and this court finding
and determining there is no just cause for delay of the appeal,
it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiffs1
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as against Defendant Dr.
David W. Brown, is denied;

that Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment against Defendant I.H.C. Hospitals, Inc., a
corporation, dba Valley View Medical Center, is hereby denied.
There is no just cause for delay of this appeal as to both of
said Orders and Judgments denying Plaintiffs' respective Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment, and it is hereby ordered that the
same and each of them be entered as final judgments. Each
party shall bear its own costs.

Dated this

A I

day of

^OKJ-

-

, 1985

BY THE COURT

C^^i

r

^v
'^hx/^^ajy

ALLEN B. SORENSEN
District Judge, Retired

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C,A. §78-14-4 and 8

78-14-4. Sutute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence, except that
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs;
and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law;
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four
years after the effective date of this act may l>e commenced only within four years
after the effective date of this act

78-14-8. Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 19 1976. This section shall
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care
provider.
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56

Rule 56. Summary Judgment.
(a) For Claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part
thereof.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10
days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day
of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case Not Fully Adjudicated on Motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; Defense Required. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be
attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of
a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits Made in Bad Faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the
I court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to
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adjudged guilty of contempt.
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